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ABSTRACT
This paper emphasizes the importance of the interaction
between tax rules and the management of monetary policy. The
monetary authorities' failure to recognize the implications of
the tax structure has caused them to underestimate just howexpan-
sionary monetary policy has been. Moreover, because of our fiscal
structure, attempts to encourage investment by an easy—money policy
have actually had an adverse impact on investment in plant and
equipment. The paper discusses the desirability of substituting
a policy of tight—money and positive fiscal incentives for the
traditional goals of easy money and fiscal restraint. More generally,
the paper stresses the significance of the fiscal structure as a
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It is now widely agreed that the mismanagement of monetary policy
over the past 15 years has been a major cause of our current obstinately
high rate of inflation. I believe that an important source of this rne—
tary mismanagement has been the failure of the monetary authorities (and of
economists in general) to understand how the interaction between inflation
and our tax rules influences the effects of monetary policy.
Morespecifically, as I shall explain in the present paper, I
believe that the monetary authorities' failure to recognize the implica-
tions ofthe fiscal structure has caused them to underestimate just how
expansionary monetary policy has been. Moreover, because of our fiscal
structure, attempts to encourage investment by an easy—money policy have
actually had an adverse impact on investment in plant and equipment. The
conventionalprescription of "easy money and a tight fiscal position" has
beenan unfortunate guide for macroeconomic policy. The switch to floating
exchangerates and the relaxation of some ofthe old restrictions on finan-
cial institutions have made it even more important to reject this conven.-
tional prescription and to pursue instead a policy mix of "tight money and
positive fiscal incentives".
I. Misjudging Monetary Tightness
During the dozen years after the 1951 accord between the Treasury—2—
and the Fed, the interest rate on Baabondsvaried only in the narrow range
between 3 1/2 percent and 5 percent. In contrast, the past 15 yearshave
seen the Baa rate rise from less than 5 percent in19614 to more than 10
percent at the beginning of 19T9. It is perhaps not surprisingtherefore
that the monetary authorities, other government officials, and many private
economists have worried throughout this period that interest rates might
be getting"too high".Critics of what was perceived as "tight money"
arguedthatsuch high interest rates would reduce investment and therefore
depressaggregate demand.
Againstall this it could be argued, and was argued,that the real
interest rate had obviously gone up much less. The correct measure of the
real interest rate is of course the difference between the nominal interest
rate and the rate of inflation that is expected over the life of thebond.
A common rule of thumb approximates the expected future inflation bythe
average inflation rate experienced during the precedingthree years. In
19614, when the Baa rate was 14.8 percent, this three—year rise in the GNP
deflator averaged 1.14 percent; the implied real interest rate was thus3.14
percent. By the beginning of 1969, when the Baa rate was10.0 percent, the
rise in the GNP deflator for the previous 3 years had increased to6.2 per-
cent, implying a real interest rate of 3.8 percent. Judged inthis way,
the cost of credit has increased only slightly over the 15 year period.
All of this ignores the role of taxes. Since interest expenses can
be deducted by individuals and businesses in calculating taxable income,
thenet—of—taxinterest cost is very much less than the interest rate—3—
itself.Indeed, since the nominal interest expense can be deducted, the
real net—of—tax interest cost has actually varied inversely with the nomi-
nal rate of inflation. What appears to have been a rising interest rate
over the past 15 years was actually a sharply falling rei after—taxcost
of funds. The failure to recognize the rol" itaxesprevented the mone-
tary authorities from seeing how expansionary monetary policyhad become.
The implication of tax decutibility is seen most easily in the case
of owner—occupied housing. A married couple with a $30,000 taxable income
now has a. marginal federal income tax rate of 37 percent. The 10 percent
mortgage rate in effect at the beginning of 1979 implied a net—of—tax cost
of funds of 6.3percent.Subtracting the 6.2 percent estimate of the rate
of inflation leaves a real net—oftax cost of funds of only 0.1 percent. By
comparison, the 1.8percentinterest rate for 196I translates into a 3.0
percent net—of—tax rate and a 1.6 percent real net—of—tax cost of funds.
Thus, although the nominal interest rate had more than doubled and the real
interest rate had also increased, the relevant net—of—tax real cost of
funds had actually fallen from 1.6 percent to only 0.1 percent.
As this example shows, taking the effects of taxation into account
is particularly important because the tax rules are so non—neutral when
there is inflation. If the tax rules were completely indexed, the effect
of the tax system on the conduct of monetary policy would be much less
significant. But with existing tax rules, the movements of the pretax real
interest rate and of the after—tax real interest rates are completely dif——it—
ferent. I think that monetary policy in the last decade was overly expan-
sionary because the monetary authorities and othersbelieved thatthe cost
of fundswasrisingor steady when in fact itwasfallingsignificantly.
Thefall in the real after—tax interest ratehas causeda rapid
increase in the price of houses relative to the general pricelevel (see
e.g., Hendershott and Hu, 1979) and hassustained a high rate of new resi-
dential construction. There were, of course, times when the ceilings on
the interest rates that financial institutions could paycaused disinter—
mediationand limited the funds available for housing. To that extent, the
high level of nominal interest rates restricted the supplyof funds at the
same time that the corresponding low real after—taxinterest cost increased
the demandforfunds. More recently, the raising of certain interest rate
ceilings and the development of mortgage—backed bonds that canshort—
circuit the disintermediation process have made the supply restrictions
much less important and have therefore made any interest level more expan-
sionary that it otherwise would have been.
The low real after tax rate of interest has also encouraged the
growthof consumer credit and the purchase of consumer durables. More
generally,even households that do not itemize their tax deductions are
affected by the low real after—tax return that is available on savings.
Because individuals paytaxon nominal interest income, the real after—tax
rate of return on saving hasbecomenegative. It seems very likely that
this substantial fall in the real return on savings has contributed tothe—5—
fall in the personal saving rate and the rise in consumerdeniand.-
For corporate borrowers, the analysis is nre complex because inflatiQn
changes the effective tax rate on investits as well asthe real net—of—tax
interest rate. More specifically, historic cost depreciation and inventory
accounting rules reduce substantially the real after—tax return on corporatein-
vestments (see Feldstein and Sununers, 1979). An easy—money policy raises the
demand for corporate capital only if the real net cost of funds falls by more
than the return that firms can af fort to pay. This balance between the lower
real net interest cost and the lower real net return on investment depends on
the corporation's debt—equity ratio and on the difference between the real
yields that must be paid ondebtandon equityfunds. Itis difficult to say
just what has happened on balance. In a preliminary study, LawrenceSummers and
I concluded that the rise in the nominal interest rate caused by inflation was
slightlyless than the rise in the maximum interestrate that firmscould afford
to pay (Feldstein and Sunnners,1978).However, this analysis made no allowance
for the effect of inventory taxation or for the more complex effects of infla-
tion on equity yields that I have more recently investigated (Feldstein, 1979a).
My current view is that on balance monetary policy reduced the demand forbusi-
ness investment at the same time that it increased the demand for residential
investment and for consumption goods.
It is useful to contrast the conclusion of this section with the con-
ventional Keynesian wisdom. According to the traditional view, monetary expansion—6—
lowers interest rates which reduces the cost of funds to investors and therefore
encourages the accumulation of plant and equipment. This statement is wrongin
three ways. First, a sustained monetary expansion raises nominal interest
rates. Second, although the interest rate ir higher, the real net—of—tax cost
of funds is lower. And, third, the lower cost of funds produced in this way
encourages investment in housing and consumer durables (as well as greater con-
sumption in general) rather than more investment in plant and equipment.
II. The Correct Mix of Monetary and Fiscal Policies
There is widespread agreement on two central goals for macroeconomic
policy: (1) achieving a level of aggregate demand that avoids both unemployment
and inflation, and (2) increasing the share of national income that is devoted
to business investment. Monetary and fiscal policy provide two instruments with
which to achieve these two goals. The traditional view of the effect of monetary
policy has led to the conventional prescription of easy money (to encourage in-
vestment) and a tight fiscal policy (to limit demand).
This policy mix could in principle achieve its two goals. A government
surplus would permit a reduction in the supply of government liabilities
(money and bonds) and would thereby facilitate increased capital accumulation.
The required change in the interest rate would depend on the relative interest
sensitivities of the market demand for bonds and money. In the likely
case in which the demand for money is relatively inelastic, the government surplus
must be accompanied by a lower rate of interest and the substitution of real
capital for governmentbonds..2—7—
Unfortunately, the traditional prescription of easy moneyand a tight
fiscal position is almost bound to fail in practicebecause of the political
difficulty of achieving and maintaining a governmentsurplus. During the past
twenty years, there have not been any twosuccessive years in which the federal
government budget shoved a surplus.As a result, the pursuit of an easy money
policy has produced inflation. Although ..neinflationary increase in the money
supply did reduce the real after—tax costof funds, this only diverted the flow
of capital away from investment in plant and equipmentand into owner—occupied
housing and consumer durables. By reducingthe real net return to savers, the
easy money policy has probably also
reduced the total amount of new saving.
The inappropriateness of the traditional policymix reflects not only
its overoptimistic view about the feasibilityof government surpluses but also
its overly narrow conception of the role of fiscal policy.In the current
macroeconomic tradition, fiscal policy has been almost synonymouswith
variations in the net government surplus or deficitand has generally ignored
the potentially powerful incentive effects of taxesthat influence marginal pri-
ces.
A more appropriate policy mix for achieving thedual goals of balanced
demand and increased business investment would combine a tight—moneypolicy and
fiscal incentives for investment and saving. A tight—moneypolicy would prevent
inflation and would raise the real net rate ofinterest. Although the higher
real rate of interest would tend to deter all formsof investment, specific
incentives for investment in plant and equipmentcould more than offset the
higher cost of funds. The combination ofthe higher real net interest rate and—8—
the targeted investment incentives would restrict housing construction and the
purchase of consumer durables while increasing the flow of capital into new
plant and equipment. Since housing and consumer durables now account for
substantially more than half of the private capital stock, such a restructuring
of the investment mix could have a substantial favorable effect on the stock of
plant and equipment.
A rise in the overall saving rate would permit a greater increase in
business investment. The higher real net rate of interest would in itself tend
to induce such a higher rate of saving. This could be supplemented by explicit
fiscal policies thatreducedthe tax rate on interest income and other income
fromsaving.
Switchingfrom an easy money policy to a policy mix with high real interest
rates would have a further advantage. Because of the current system of floating
exchange rates, a rise in the real interest rate would cause an appreciationof the
dollarwhich would in turn reduce the price level directly(see e.g., Dornbusch and
Krugman,1977). With less than perfect international capital mobility, higher
interestrates could persist and would tend to attract some inflow of foreign capiti
that would further augment investment in the United States.
III. Macroeconomic Importance of the Fiscal Structure
The misjudgement of monetary tightness and the advocacy of an
inappropriate policy mix suggest the importance of recognizing that the fiscal
structure of ourecononr is a key determinant of the macroeconomic
equilibrium and therefore of the effect of monetary policy. Conventional—9—
macroeconomicanalyses that ignore the fiscal structure (or that assumethat all
taxes are equivalent to lump suni taxes) can be seriouslymisleading.3 The fact
that the real interest rate can simultaneously rise on a pretaxbasis and fall
on a net—of—tax basis shows that fiscal efectswith the existing U.S. tax law
are qualitatively as well as quantitatively important.
The common tendency to ignore the tax structure inmacroeconomic analy-
sis is due at least in part to the fact that taxes were muchless important at
the time that the current nxdels of macroeconomic analysis weredeveloped. When
Keynes' General Theory was first published, less than five percentof American
families were affected by the income tax and the median tax rate amongthose who
paid tax was less than five percent. The greatercurrent significance of the
thefiscal structure reflects not only the growth of the income taxbut also the
increased importance of social insurance programs like unemploymentinsurance
and social security.
Thetax structure is particularly important as a cause of the macroeco-
nomic non—neutrality of inflation. Irving Fisherts (1930) famousconclusion
thatinflation raises the nominal interest rate but leaves the real rate
unchanged is appropriate for an economy with no taxes but notfor an economy in
which nominal interest payments are reflected in income and profitsthat are
subject to substantial marginal tax rates. I have shownelsewhere (Feldstein,
19T6)thatin an economy with economic depreciation and a 50 percenttax rate,—10—
eachon percent increased in the inflation rate raises the nominal interest rate
by two percent. With other depreciation rules, the effect of the inflation rate
onthe interest rate can be more than one—to—one or less than one—to—one
(Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski, 1978).
Moregenerally, the tax structure determines how inflation influences
thereal values of corporate equities (Feidstein, 1978b, 1979a and Hendershott,
1979) of residential real estate (Hendershott and Hu, 1979), and of such "store
of value" assets as land and gold (Feldstein, 1979b). As Hartrnan (1979) has
shown, the tax rules may also induce international capital flows in response to
changes in inflation that would have no real effect in the absence of taxation.
IV. Some Conclusions
This paper has emphasized the importance of the fiscal structure as a
determinant of the macroeconomic equilibrium. It discussed the desirability of
substituting a policy of tight money and positive fiscal incentives for the tra-
ditional goals of easy money and fiscal restraint. More specifically, it iden-
tified the failure to recognize the effects of the tax rules as an important
reason for the mismanagement of monetary policy. Although the guidance of
shortrun monetary policy may now give more weight to controlling the money
supply and credit aggregates, interest rates will almost certainly continue to
influece the determination of longer—termmonetary policy. The correct
interpretationof the relation between interest rates and inflation therefore
remains important and will become even more important if the authorities attempt
to shift to a policy of tighter money and an altered tax structure.—11—
Bibliography
Boskin, Michael, J.,, "Taxation, Saving, and the Rate of Interest," Journal of
Political Economy, 86, No. 2, Part 2 (April 1978), S3-S27.
Dornbusch, Rudiger and P. Krugman, "Flexible Exchange Rates in the Short Run,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3, 1976, 537-584.
Feldstein, Martin, "Inflation, Income Taxes and the Rate of Interest: Theoretical
Analysis," American Economic Rev3w, Vol. 66, No.5,December 1966,
809-820.
"The Rate of Return, Taxation, and Personal Saving,"
Economic Journal, Vol.88, No. 351, September, l978a, 482-487.
"Inflation and the Stock Market," American Economic Review,
(1978b),
_________________"Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Stock Market," NBER Working
Paper Series, No. 403 (1979a).
_________________"The Effect of Inflation on the Prices of Land and Gold,"
NBER Working Paper Series, No. 296 (l979b).
"Fiscal Policies, Inflation and Capital Formation," American
Economic Review, (1980).
_________________,J.Green and E. Sheshinski, "Inflation and Taxes in a Growing
Economy with Debt and Equity Finance," Journal of Political Economy,
86, No. 2, Part 2 (April 1978), S53-S70.
and L. Summers, "Inflation, Tax Rules and the Long-Term
Interest Rate," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1978, 61-100.
_________________________________"Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income
in the Corporate Sector," National Tax Journal, forthcoming.
Hartinan, David, "Taxation and tie Effects of Inflation on the Real Capital Stock
in an Open Economy," International Economic Review, Vol.20, No.2,
June 1979, 417-425.—12—
Hendershott, Patric, "The Decline in Aggregate Share Values:Inflation and
Taxation of the Returns from Equities and
Owlier-Occupied Housing,"
NBER Working Paper Series, No. 370, 1979.
_____________________andSheng Cheng Hu, "Inflation and the Benefits fromOwner-
Occupied Housing," NBER Working Paper Series, No.383, 1979.
Summers, Lawrence H., "Tax Policy in a Life CycleModel," NBER Working Paper




HarvardUniversity and the National Bureau of Economic Research. This
paper will be presented at the annual meeting of the American Economic
Association on December 28, 1979. The views expressed here are the authorTs
and should not be attributed to any organization.
1Although the response of household saving to even a compensated change
in the interest rate is theoretically ambiguous (Feldstein, 1978A), plausible
parameter values and some econometric evdence support a positive saving
elasticity (Boskin, 1978; Summers, 1979).
2See Feldstein (1980) for a formal model of the relation of fiscalpolicy,
monetary policy and capital formation in a fully—employed economy.
3lgnoring the tax structure is analagous to ignoring the international
aspects of domestic economic equilibrium; there are issues for which both
taxes and international aspects can be ignored but there are others for
which doing so would be very inappropriate.